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‘Total Gating’: Sociality and the Fortification of Networked Spaces 
 
Abstract 
Starting with a description of Wynyard Park in Teesside, a development that 
combines gated residence, workplace and leisure space, ‘fear of the other’ is 
identified as a key but underexplored motivating force behind this kind of ‘total 
gating’, an argument based on existing empirical studies of gated communities. It is 
argued that a radical reading of Emmanuel Levinas’ ethics of the other can do the 
explanatory work that would flesh out this allusion to fear: first, by reading the 
unknowable Levinasian other as repulsive in his/her threat to the individual’s 
ontological security; and second, by making ontological insecurity fundamental to 





Urban spaces offer excitement. Cities are hotbeds of culture, of vital encounters and 
stimulating unpredictability. At the same time, so too are they breeding grounds for 
fear, for fear of crime, of random incivility and of the contingency of social 
confrontations. The gated community symbolises this provocatively. Gates and walls, 
security guards and CCTV cameras, are testimony to the idea that proximity to others 
is not solely a ‘compulsion’ (Boden & Molotch, 1994), that it can sometimes be 
repulsive. In this article I explore this fear of others that manifests itself in gating. 
Why do we fear the other? And what impact does gating have upon the ethical 
sociality that is grounded in proximity to others? The focus, then, is on the fortified 
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mooring around which expeditions into the social space of the urban environment are 
organised. This focus is justified given that gated communities are the centre of a 
network of mobilities to other privileged sites. They are also nodal points in a virtual 
network, technological connectivity being essential to their physically isolated 
existence. It is valuable to explore such remote places – to not just focus on mobility 
alone (as in, for example, Bauman (2008b) on liquid modernity or Augé (2008) on the 
bypassing of anthropological place) – in order to gain an understanding of the mutual 
constructions of mobilities and immobilities, or, in John Urry’s terms, the 
‘relationality’ or ‘dialectic of mobility/moorings’ (2003, see esp. pp.125-26; see also 
Hannam, Sheller & Urry, 2006). Mobilities of various kinds are important but what is 
also required is an understanding of the moorings, the periods of immobility at their 
core and the sites where routine socialities are grounded: this time/space will shape 
mobilities. My concern here is not with the locked-in immobility that contrasts with 
the mobility of the affluent (‘the vagabonds’ versus ‘the tourists’ (Bauman, 2007)) but 
with the mooring (the time/space of grounded sociality) of the mobile affluent and 
aspirational classes – in this case, the occupants of gated residential/work/leisure 
areas. 
 
First, I will introduce the Wynyard Park development in the North East of England, a 
site of what we might call ‘total gating’: a combined gated residence, workplace and 
leisure space. My purpose here is not to give a detailed case study but, rather, to tell 
the story of what strikes me as an extreme extension of the gating phenomenon – in 
the area in which I live – in order to subsequently make some theoretical observations 
about the ethical sociality of mobility/moorings. Engaging with the wide body of 
literature on gated communities and networked urban environments, I will highlight 
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‘fear of the other’ as an oft-cited motivator behind the move to gating that nonetheless 
remains underdeveloped. Second, in order to meet the demand to fully articulate this 
fear of the other, I suggest a radical reading of Emmanuel Levinas’ ethics of the other, 
most notably set-out in his Totality and Infinity (2007) and Otherwise Than Being 
(2008). It will be argued that Levinas’ other – transcendent, unknowable – is a source 
of fear as s/he threatens the ontological security of the ‘I’ (or individual) in 
confrontation. The other is further repellent because of the demands s/he makes of the 
‘I’ to enter into social commerce, to direct him/herself towards the other morally. As 
such we can expand on the notion of fear of the other found in gating literature with 
recourse to a two-fold ontological insecurity: that posed by the unknowable 
Levinasian other; and that which is fundamental to the Levinasian account of ethical 
sociality. Finally, I will expand on the idea of the repulsion of the other, utilising Paul 
Virilio’s (1998) figure of the spastic, who controls their environment technologically 





Near Billingham in the North East of England is Wynyard Park. The village of 
Wynyard itself is part of the sprawling urban conurbation of Teesside. Together with 
Middlesbrough, Stockton-on-Tees, Billingham, Redcar and Ingleby Barwick, 
Teesside is a sizable urban area with a population of 365,323, according to 2001 
census data. If we add to this the towns of Eaglescliffe and Yarm – contiguous to 
Stockton and Ingleby Barwick respectively, as well as to each other – then that 
population increases by 18,335. Although, by population, it is one of the smaller 
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conurbations in the UK, it is in this urban environment that Wynyard Park Ltd has 
positioned their mixed-use development: a combination of business park and 
residential area, targeted at the aspirational middle-classes. The site is still in 
development and, whilst the business park is already in use, at the time of writing the 
residential area is yet to be constructed. 
 
The area of Wynyard is already home to a gated housing estate, the location of which 
Wynyard Park Ltd plan to take advantage of whilst construction is ongoing. As the 
developers emphasise, ‘[t]he North East’s most exclusive private housing 
development is literally a stones [sic] throw from Wynyard Park’;1 namely the 
Wynyard Hall estate, currently home to millionaire entrepreneurs and footballers past 
and present. This may only be a temporary endorsement until Wynyard Park’s own 
‘exclusive housing’ – the Wynyard Park Estate – is in use. In their own words:  
 
Wynyard Park is an exceptional site ideally situated in the heart of the 
Tees Valley in the North East of England. The site provides businesses 
of any type or size with a fantastic opportunity to establish them selves 
within a prestigious development that is designed to balance Lifestyle, 
Living and Business perfectly.  
 
This coupling of living/lifestyle with business is central to the Wynyard Park ethos, as 
they seek to mesh the domicile with the workplace, and boast ‘a standard of living 
that is unsurpassed’ and ‘the very best in both country and urban city living’. Also 
integral then is the privacy of suburban life coupled with the vibrancy and 
connectivity of city life. Transport links to the surrounding areas are emphasised but 
the developers also highlight the proximity of local leisure facilities (‘health clubs, 
championship golf courses, internationally renowned sports facilities, shopping and 
nightlife’) and plan for the construction of their own such facilities to service the 
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planned ‘exclusive’ (i.e. gated) housing estate. The site will offer ‘advanced’ ICT 
infrastructure, as ‘Wynyard Park Ltd are currently in discussions with a number of 
major ICT suppliers to ensure that the site is at the forefront of the latest technological 
advancements’. Also emphasised is ‘24-hour security with full CCTV coverage’. This 
security is to include road monitoring and patrols, whilst many of the roads will be 
private anyway. On the business side of things (if we can so easily separate this from 
the domestic) the Wynyard Business Park site provides office accommodation, 
warehouse facilities and storage and distribution centres. Security here is ‘a prime 
concern’ and consists of 24-hour guard patrols (365 days a year); a manned 
gatehouse; extensive site surveillance with all vehicles recorded entering or exiting 
the site and the use of infrared CCTV; building access control systems; and an on-site 
police station. ICT infrastructure is again highlighted as of paramount importance. 
The business park also boasts its own nursery, gym, pub and bistro, with intranet file-
sharing available at the latter. Moving forward, the Wynyard Park ‘master plan’ is to 
create ‘a sustainable community incorporating a mixed use to meet a vision of a site 
that facilitates work, leisure and living and provides a high quality of life and well-
being’.  
 
So: what we see here is a development that combines domestic space with commercial 
space; is to an extent self-contained whilst drawing on the surrounding urban 
conurbation of Teesside; is highly connected by physical and ICT infrastructure; and 
is strongly defended by gating, 24-hour security and CCTV. I suggest that this is an 
extreme type of gating – its logical extension – and so a useful site for exploring 
questions of ethical sociality in the urban environment, chief amongst them: what 
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motivates this move towards total gating, the desire to live in a gated estate in the 
same development as one’s gated place of work? 
 
Gating 
Total gating, then, describes the combination of fortified residences, workplaces and 
leisure spaces, close in proximity and connected by defended commuter pathways. In 
what follows I will draw on the existing literature on gating in order to demonstrate 
that ‘fear of the other’ is one of the key motivating factors behind this phenomenon; 
that is, that the perceived social danger exhibited by the unfamiliar ‘others’ of the 
urban environment results in the desire to live and work in closely linked gated 
communities. 
 
Of course, fear of the other is one amongst numerous motivations for moving into 
gated communities, whether ‘mixed use’ or not. Setha Low sets out a comprehensive 
list of factors in her Behind the Gates (2003), noting class, the search for community, 
finance (for example, maintenance of property prices or tax incentives), and fear of 
crime, alongside fear of the other. Whilst notable studies into class (Atkinson & Flint, 
2004; Low, 2001), community (Bauman, 2008b, pp.90-109; Wilson-Doenges, 2000), 
finance (Low, 2006; Webster, 2002) and crime (Helsley & Strange, 1999; Wilson-
Doenges, 2000) have added significantly to our understanding of gating, the notion of 
fear of the other has often remained underdeveloped.  
 
With this in mind we ought now to ask: What accounts for this move towards the kind 
of total gating seen in the Wynyard case? We see in numerous studies, as well as in 
Zygmunt Bauman’s synthetic work on community (2008a), as a motivating factor the 
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preoccupation with the imagined need to avoid encounters with those people seen to 
be dangerous by virtue of difference or unfamiliarity. With the loss of permeability 
brought about by gating comes the exclusion of the general populace, a restriction on 
the movement of unrecognised others, and so the imposition of a feeling of safety. 
There is, on the one hand, exclusion of others and, on the other, self-imposed 
exclusion or withdrawal. For the residents the aim is to create predictability and safety 
through disengagement: 
 
The process of gating surrounds an attempt, in part, to disengage 
with wider urban problems and responsibilities, both fiscal and 
social, in order to create a ‘weightless’ experience of the urban 
environment with elite fractions seamlessly moving between secure 
residential, workplace, education and leisure destinations (Atkinson 
& Blandy, 2005, p.180). 
 
Whilst the above passage mentions gating alongside the elite, we can see, as with 
Wynyard Park, the potential for use of such strategies by the aspirational middle-
classes. Methods vary according to budget but the search for security seems to be 
prevalent across the spectrum. The sliding scale of forms of withdrawal begins with 
insulation (residential preference determined by personal identity), progresses to 
incubation (sheltering and the linking of home to places of work, leisure, etc.), and 
ends, in its most extreme form, with incarceration (total insulation – e.g. the gated 
residential/work area) (Atkinson, 2006, pp.822-23). Progression through these 
strategies is a movement towards social homogeneity and disconnectedness. It should 
be noted that incarceration relates both to the aspirational or affluent who lock 
themselves in and the poor who are locked away with little hope of escape; the 
difference is the interconnectivity of the spaces of the former, as gated residential 
areas are ‘live’ (i.e. wired up to the information society) as opposed to ‘dead’ (i.e. cut 
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off) (Lash, 2002). So: there is a scale of strategies used to restrict the access of the 
unwanted, varying from symbolic to concrete methods of defending space:  
 
1) Insulation: greater proximity to similar others; 
2) Incubation: greater proximity, or more secure corridors to key sites; 
3) Incarceration: reduced proximity to dissimilar or unknown others. 
 
Across the spectrum these strategies have in common the creation of impermeability 
and an increasingly private lifestyle for those on the inside. 
 
Crucially, the (fragile) feeling of safety created by gating seems to manifest itself as 
the evasion of unnecessary social interaction: ‘It is important to recognise that 
security is not aimed solely at protecting residents against serious crime but also 
meets an apparent desire to avoid day-to-day incivilities and random social contact’ 
(Atkinson & Flint, 2004, p.880); so, incivilities and unexpected civilities. The irony is 
that forting-up seems not to decrease fear; after conducting interviews with residents, 
Atkinson and Flint report that gating increases sensitisation to social dangers such that 
‘fear of outsiders appeared to increase’ (ibid, p.880). Anxiety about unsolicited 
encounters remains and feeds into the perceived need for fortification. Rowland 
Atkinson highlights the desire for spatial autonomy represented by strategies of 
fortification, a desire rooted in ‘a deeper strategy to manage contact with socially 
different or “risky” groups’ (2006, p.819). He further notes that segregation is the 
result of deep-seated inclinations towards like-with-like interaction, and is reinforced 
by a similarly deep-seated ‘fear of otherness’ (ibid, p.820). Needless to say, there is 
little interaction between insiders and outsiders. As Atkinson and Blandy note: ‘GC 
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[gated community] residents do not mix at all with residents outside the gates’ (2005, 
p.184).  
 
Before we continue we should note the intimate link between this sort of fortification 
and new media technologies. That is, new technologies make the bunker mentality of 
these defended spaces more practicable than ever before. It is not only the CCTV 
cameras and high-end alarm systems – the most visible and audible features – that 
make it possible to live a life cut off from social ‘danger’. More subtly, new media 
technologies make living behind the gates more practical and more comfortable. 
Social media, online shopping, online newspapers, online gaming, teleconferencing, 
teleworking, and so on; all these things make unnecessary excursions into the world 
outside less likely. Now, this is not to say that new media technologies lead 
necessarily to an indoors existence and to less frequent contact with others; it is only 
to say that for those with a desire to avoid contact with certain others there are 
options. And, as we have seen, there are people with just such a desire. For Wynyard 
Park ICT connectivity is paramount, with particular emphasis on high-speed 
broadband connections.2  
 
Ellison and Burrows (2007, p.300) note that the disengagement from proximate 
surroundings is likely to be virtual as well as physical: 
 
the development of inter-spatial networks of communication with 
others who possess similar economic and cultural capital, 
increasingly facilitated by the dramatic expansion of ICTs, conjures 
an image of ‘communities of the mind’, where social interaction is as 
likely to be electronic as ‘physical’ or face-to-face. Indeed, where it 
is face-to-face, such proximity will be the result of individualised 
journeys using private transport, taking ‘private’ families from one 
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spatial locality to another with similar socio-spatial and cultural 
characteristics (ibid, p.303). 
 
Drawing on Robson and Butler (2001) Ellison and Burrows suggest that the urban 
middle-classes create a ‘virtual urban village’ in which ‘there is an awareness of 
others but not much in the way of actual interaction’ (2007, p.301). Disengagement 
here is as much virtual as it is actual; evasion of encounters with others is as much 
about the use of new technologies as it is physical barriers and isolated commuter 
corridors.  
 
So: this ‘sod-off architecture’ (Atkinson & Flint, 2004, p.882) of the networked gated 
community stands as a physical marker of the combined physical-virtual 
disengagement from the urban scene. Just as Manuel Castells (2006, pp.434-40) 
observes of what he calls the ‘mega-city’ (or networked city), the networked gated 
community may be globally connected but locally disconnected. The strategies 
described above illustrate the double-edged sword of virtual and physical withdrawal 
from a locality, highlighting the evasion of encounters with others perceived as 
sources of insecurity and fear. The biggest danger is that physical and virtual 
withdrawal marks a withdrawal from the public sphere in general, leading to apathy 
towards proximate spaces, the people in them and the city as a whole.3 
 
‘Bubbling’ 
In exploring total gating we should not focus only on the mooring itself (the fortified 
homestead or workplace or leisure space); these fortified spaces are ‘protected nodes 
in a wider network that create a counterpart city with flows of affluent residents 
moving while cloaked from the observation of the majority of residents’ (Atkinson & 
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Flint, 2004, p.886). These protected nodes are linked by patterns of movement that are 
divorced from the social context. There is pronounced car use amongst the residents 
of these fortified spaces and they rarely walk anywhere. This is significant in that it 
feeds into the ‘privatisation of mobile space’ (ibid, p.888). Taken to the extreme, for 
some residents the only public space traversed is that between their car and their 
destination (the office, shop or school). As such, their cognitive map of the urban 
environment results in homogenous contact and limited encounters with others; they 
move through ‘shielded corridors’ (ibid, p.889). This represents yet further 
withdrawal from public space. Travel becomes ‘shielded from interface by other 
social groups’ (Atkinson, 2006, p.821). Movement is protected to and from gated 
residential areas; sports utility vehicles (SUVs), secure car parks, private roads, and 
semi-public shopping centres allow for ‘passage in seclusion or near-invisibility’ 
(ibid, p.830). The insiders live in a separate world, leading a commuter lifestyle. 
Segregation extends from the fortified home out into public space. Eduardo Mendieta 
describes this exploitation and manufacturing of urban fear as a ‘new anti-urbanism’ 
(2005, p.195). He suggests we add the SUV and the Hummer – ‘a vehicle of war, a 
machine of escape and velocity in and through the urban jungle’ (ibid, p.195) – to 
strategies of gating as another element of urban fear. He notes: 
 
The barbarians at the gates have mutated into the dwellers of the 
slums and ghettos of today’s global elites. And if the defences are 
overrun and the gates collapse, the fleets of SUVs and Hummers are 
parked in the underground garages of these self-contained bunkers of 
late modernity, ready for the escape caravan (ibid, p.198). 
 
The SUV, when combined with the gated community, demonstrates ‘the interaction 
between a desire for social homogeneity, predictability and status’ (Atkinson & 
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Blandy, 2009, p.96). These vehicles are seen to provide the sense of safety through 
‘hazardous’ (unpredictable) spaces. 
 
Atkinson (2006) has described the mobility of gated community residents as 
‘bubbled’; that is, the residents attempt to manage and minimise unexpected 
encounters with others whilst in transit to locations away from the fortified 
homestead.4 These locations are very often fortified, or at least exclusive, themselves, 
leaving only the spaces (for us ‘places’, for them ‘spaces’) in between as ‘dangerous’ 
(read: strange, unmanageable, other).5 As we saw with the case of Wynyard Park, 
fortified homes and workplaces are connected by private roads and private transport, 
and are monitored by CCTV. The whole site is compact, with all the desired services 
in close proximity to home and workplace. The result is that the occupiers will be able 
to commute (often short distances) without being bothered by others. As Atkinson and 
Flint note: ‘It is now possible for social factions to exercise unprecedented control 
over their experience of the city in terms of to whom, how and when social encounters 
are made’ (2004, p.877). Bubbled mobility – a sense of remove and safety from the 
heterogeneous, unpredictable, and therefore dangerous urban environment and its 
inhabitants – makes total gating possible.  
 
Recapitulation 
Drawing on the existing literature on gating has allowed me to identify four key 
points for the present study: first, gating appears to be motivated, in part, by fear of 
the other (Atkinson, 2006); second, this fear of the other does not decrease as the level 
of fortification increases (Atkinson & Flint, 2004); third, total gating is made possible 
by ICT connectivity (Ellison & Burrows, 2007); and finally, the space in between 
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fortified places (home, work, leisure) can be navigated in a bubble (Atkinson, 2006), 
maintaining the fortification and making total gating possible. 
 
 
Ontological Insecurity  
As we have seen, we can account for the move behind the gates with reference to fear 
of the other – but what is experienced with the other that instantiates this fear? Whilst 
fear of the other is noted by many researchers, what is required now is to work out 
quite what this consists of. Low (2003, p.131) is correct to say that this fear is difficult 
to express. Nevertheless, if it is to be of any explanatory use it must be in some way 
explored and articulated. In what follows I will draw on the ‘ethics of the other’ 
articulated in Emmanuel Levinas’ Totality and Infinity (2007) and Otherwise than 
Being (2008). It is first argued that Levinas’ unknowable other is a source of fear by 
virtue of his/her ontologically insecure nature. It is further argued that this ontological 
insecurity should be understood as fundamental to Levinas’ conception of ethical 
sociality. An active reading of Levinas’ work will not only make it possible to offer 
an account of this fear of the other, but also to situate gated disengagement in a moral 
discourse. 
 
Ontological Insecurity as a Source of ‘Fear of the Other’ 
What accounts for the fear of the other? From the studies on gated communities 
examined above we can see that, although it plays a part, the actions of the other (the 
potential for crime or anti-social behaviour) are not essential; rather, it appears to be 
otherness per se, the otherness of the other, that is the determining factor. One way of 
explaining this is by turning to Levinas, first by arguing that his phenomenological 
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account of encounters lends itself to a repulsive interpretation of the other; and 
second, by demonstrating that fear of the other can be explained by the ontological 
insecurity at the heart of Levinas’ ‘I’-other relation.   
 
For Levinas, the other is always a mystery to the ‘I’ who encounters him/her. The 
relation of the ‘I’ to the other cannot be classified as a totality, a ‘we’; to do this, there 
would have to be some way for the ‘I’ to escape the ‘I’-other relation, retreating to a 
point where a ‘we’ could be observed (Levinas, 2007, p. 35). This, of course, is not 
possible. ‘We’ means common ground, mutual understanding: ‘we’ are of a shared 
mind. Without this there is no commonality, only two isolated subjects, the ‘I’ never 
capable of knowing whether or not s/he shares motivations or intentions with the 
other. There can be no understanding between them. The thoughts of the other, 
Levinas writes, can never be reduced to the possessions of the ‘I’, that is, they remain 
hidden (ibid, 43). Quite what the other is all about escapes the individual’s ‘grasp’ 
(ibid, 39). 
 
This position can be illuminated with reference to the film noir Lady in the Lake 
(1947), a reference that also highlights the repulsive aspect of Levinas’ formulation of 
the phenomenology of the encounter. Our experience of the other is perpetually like 
that of Robert Montgomery’s Phillip Marlowe character: a narrow first person 
perspective that gives a dangerous nature to the other in proximity, as unknowable 
others loom close to the camera/eye – something that would be alleviated with a wider 
shot, a third person perspective. In reality there is no third person perspective, we are 
limited to the narrow first person point of view that gives only a surface image, 
allowing for no demystification of the strangeness of the other. In reality, as in the 
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film, we are denied an objective view. There is only the limited perspective of the ‘I’: 
the proximity of others, whom we cannot know – know their narrative, back story, 
intentions – looms with menace. As Levinas notes, even in those close to a given 
individual there remains something impenetrable, ‘the stranger in the neighbour’ 
(2008, p.123). Whilst we tolerate this abyss of otherness in our nearest and dearest, it 
makes those with whom we are less familiar too contingent, too unpredictable to 
tolerate. When the residents of gated communities fail to put attributes to the others 
they fear it becomes apparent that it is the otherness itself, which is to say the 
contingent and unpredictable nature of the other, that is the greatest concern. 
 
When Low (2003, p.131) states that the fear of the other found amongst residents of 
gated communities is difficult to articulate she is, to my mind, correct. However, she 
then proceeds to conflate this fear with racial prejudice (ibid, pp.133-52). This is, as 
she demonstrates, certainly an aspect of the fear. But it does not take into account the 
desire to evade random civilities that we saw above (Atkinson & Flint, 2004, p.880), 
nor the fear of others sullying the ‘niceness’ of one’s area that Low herself notes 
(2003, pp.153-54). Reducing fear of the other to fear of a particular kind of other 
(Latinos or Blacks in Low’s study) is to lose sight of the nature of this fear. It is 
difficult to express because it is not in fact fear of anything in particular. It is a fear 
that the other might trample the flowerbeds; fear that the other might have the 
audacity to ask for directions or spare change; fear that the other might burgle one’s 
house or pose a threat to one’s children. Not that we should reduce fear of the other to 
fear of crime; as we saw above, fear does not decrease as crime does nor as security 
increases (Atkinson & Flint, 2004, p.880). This suggests that it is not the actions of 
the other that create fear but rather not knowing their intentions, not knowing what 
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their actions could possibly be. It is, precisely, fear of Levinas’ other, that alien, 
ungraspable entity with whom I share no common ground. From the limited vantage 
point of the house-holder – unknown others seen through windows, or at the darkest 
corners of the estate – outsiders appear to carry a threat by virtue of being unknown, 
their intentions beyond us, hence the motivation for gating: to keep them out. This 
vantage point becomes further removed with gating, the other now viewed through the 
CCTV monitor or through the gates, and so ever more distant and strange – an 
exaggerated ‘Phillip Marlowe-view’. Even neighbours are strange at heart, and so we 
also see the use of contractual codes of conduct within gated communities in order to 
keep the others within the gates at a tolerable level of sameness (Atkinson & Flint, 
2004, p.881). 
 
What I want to suggest, then, is that the other is feared because the other is a source of 
ontological insecurity. With the other I can share no common ground, s/he is not 
wholly in my site. This is to be understood, not physically, but ontologically. That is 
to say that the other escapes my capacity to know what there is with regards the other. 
If no totality can be formed then the other remains transcendent, an encounter with the 
other is an encounter with infinity (which is, for Levinas, the opposite of totality, that 
which escapes understanding). It is my contention that this transcendence is a threat to 
the ontological security of the ‘I’; if the other remains transcendent then the ‘I’ cannot 
know comprehensively what there is. The other as such is unknowable and therefore 
unpredictable; the environment which others occupy or move through becomes 
insecure. The urban environment – occupied by these others, with whom encounters 
are also unpredictable – becomes dangerous. If humans desire stability and sameness, 
as Anthony Giddens (1991; 1997) has argued, then total gating is a logical response to 
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this insecurity and otherness. The unpredictable nature of the other can be curtailed by 
minimising contact and maximising distance through gating and bubbling – in 
extreme cases, total. This, as we have seen, does not reduce fear but it does keep risk 
at a distance. 
 
Ontological Insecurity as an Event of Ethical Sociality 
I do not believe, however, that it is sufficient merely to explain fear of the other in the 
context of gating. As Bauman notes, the critical sociologist should ‘refuse to accept 
that something is right simply for being there’ (2009, p.3). Recourse to Levinas is 
justified not only for the explanatory gap it fills in relation to fear of the other as 
motivation for gating; it also allows us to state that the gating constellation, this 
mechanism for avoiding encounters, simply is not right. In order to demonstrate this, I 
will argue that ontological insecurity is a major constituent of Levinas’ ethical 
sociality. 
 
As Bauman (2009, pp.62-81) observes, Levinas’ unknowable other and the ‘I’ are 
ontologically separate. Ontologically speaking the ‘I’ is only ever alongside the other; 
something must happen to bridge the gap, otherwise there could be no relation 
between the two – and this something must be beyond ontology. For Levinas this 
bridging event occurs in the encounter, where the other confronts the ‘I’ with its very 
exteriority. Presented with exteriority, the ‘I’ is called to leave the safety of interiority 
(the egoism or solipsism of the ‘I’) and engage with the other in the intersubjective 
realm. Levinas writes: ‘the Other Person tears me away from my hypostasis, from the 
here, at the heart of being or the center of the world in which, privileged, and in this 
sense primordial, I place myself’ (1998, p.86). In other words, it is the ‘I’ that bridges 
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the gap by eschewing this imagined privileged position and directing him/herself 
towards the other. 
 
This tearing away from oneself, this direction towards the other, is, for Levinas the 
event of ethical sociality. The ‘I’ is confronted with the existence of the other in the 
encounter, exteriority posited against the interiority of egoism. We can speak of 
‘confrontation’ here because the encounter of ‘I’ with other, interiority with 
exteriority, is experienced as resistance: here is another entity, an other with secret 
motivations and intentions. The ‘I’ can no longer behave as if in that privileged 
position, and so must instead limit her/his actions to take into account the presence of 
the other. By confronting the ‘I’ with otherness, with something other to the ‘I’, the 
freedom of the ‘I’ is limited. Demands are made of the ‘I’ to co-exist with others; the 
‘I’ cannot behave as if s/he were alone, and so her/his powers and actions must be 
limited – ‘the calling into question of my spontaneity’ (Levinas, 2007, p.43). The very 
freedom of the ‘I’ to act without concern for consequences is curtailed; the other must 
now be accommodated. For Levinas, this ruptures the egoism of the ‘I’, enforcing 
‘being-with-others’ rather than ‘being-for-oneself’. As such, the direction towards the 
other is ‘the ethical event of sociality’ (Levinas, 2007, p.207): the ‘I’ enters a world of 
others, of ‘social commerce’ (Levinas, 1993, p.21) in which the freedom of the ‘I’ to 
act must be subjected to self-imposed limits. This prohibition is the responsibility for 
the other that constitutes Levinas’ ethics.6 
 
What I want to suggest is that not only is the Levinasian other a source of ontological 
insecurity, but so too the ethical sociality that Levinas grounds in the encounter with 
this other. The privileged position of egoism, of shunning the presence of the 
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unknowable other, is the most secure of ontological centres. To be drawn out of this 
and towards the other is to de-centre oneself, to open oneself up to all the contingent 
unpredictability of social commerce. Since we cannot know how the other will 
respond, directing oneself towards them in a gesture of responsibility is a risk. The 
other might take offence, or find this response injurious. The other might lash out, 
harm us. The intersubjective realm of Levinasian ethics is an unpredictable, insecure 
social space. 
 
Such an account of ontological insecurity would stand in contrast to that offered by 
Giddens (1991; 1997). For Giddens, ontological security is a desirable state of 
stability (knowing what there is with the other) whilst ontological insecurity is a 
negative state of uncertainty. Giddens’ approach is psychological whilst a Levinasian 
approach would be phenomenological: the former is limited to what the individual 
thinks and feels (egoism) whilst the latter opens up an intersubjective dimension by 
exploring insecurity as an encounter with another, the phenomenological experience 
of the other. This latter approach recasts ontological insecurity as the necessary state 
of encounter from which sociality is derived, and ontological security as its evasion. 
By doing so, the concept of ontological insecurity can do a lot more work in the 
context of gating. Giddens’ account, by making ontological security a desirable state, 
would force us to understand the gated community in a positive light as an extreme 
strategy for achieving security. A Levinasian account would put ontological insecurity 
at the heart of the encounter, rather than as something to be managed through 
encounters. Further, it makes the individual’s response to this fundamental insecurity 




The other as resistance to the freedom of the ‘I’ is curious in the context of total 
gating; it would suggest that the operation of these fortified spaces is fundamentally 
backwards: the bunker architecture that physically resists the intrusion of the other is 
an exaggerated reversal of the idea that the other resists the bunker-dweller. It would 
also seem to explain, in part, the motivation for the construction and use of these 
structures; the sense of ontological security is maintained by this backwards 
resistance: if the other resists me then I will resist the other, seeking security in 
networked gated communities. This is a pathetic and irresponsible gesture. The 
repulsion that motivates gating, the fear of the other, is derived from the two-fold 
ontological insecurity outlined above: the unknowability of the other and the risk of 
the intersubjective environment. Nevertheless, these two factors can be understood as 
grounding the responsibility that binds sociality. Pathetic because no amount of 
fortification or bubbled mobility could ever hope to evade something so fundamental 
to social existence. Irresponsible as it is to renege on the duty to be-for-others that 
makes sociality possible. The very possibility of sociality is the debt we owe to the 
other. 
 
Morality occurs in social space. As such, how we change that space impacts upon the 
ethical relationships that occur within it. The interpretation of Levinas outlined above 
allows us not only to account for the fear of the other, the repulsive other, in terms of 
ontological insecurity, but also to understand these developments as what Robert Sack 
would call ‘bad places’ (ibid, p.270). 
 
 
Concluding Remarks: (Repulsive) Proximity, Mobility, and Mooring 
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In what remains I will expand upon the narrow focus on fear of the other in instances 
of total gating in order to make some general observations of the consequences for a 
theory of mobility/moorings that hinges on proximity. 
 
Urry (2002) has argued that the desire for co-present encounters shapes human 
mobilities. Despite the availability of increasingly ingenious technologies that offer 
virtual proximity – Apple’s iPhone 4 with its video calling, Skype, avatar interaction 
online, for example – we still take the time to travel out into what Don DeLillo calls 
‘meat space’ (2003, p.64), eschewing the virtual in favour of the fleshy proximity of 
the face-to-face. What Boden and Molotch (1994) called the ‘compulsion of 
proximity’ organises our mobility. 
 
However, what this does not take account of is the repulsion of proximity that is also 
felt, the negative response to the over-proximity of others. Slavoj Žižek (2008) has 
articulated this well. ‘What increasingly emerges as the central human right in late-
capitalist society,’ he argues, ‘is the right not to be harassed, which is a right to 
remain at a safe distance from others’ (ibid, p.35). We see this in the obsessive fear of 
harassment and random in/civilities noted of the gated community residents above, or, 
Žižek would add, in a society obsessed with stalking and sexual harassment. Fear of 
over-proximity, he observes, has become a major constituent of our subjectivity (ibid, 
p.34). The repulsion of proximity must be understood alongside its compulsion if we 
are to understand the way that mobilities and moorings are organised. 
 
Paul Virilio, in his Open Sky (1998), understands this well. His notion of ‘the spastic’ 
not only evokes this repulsion to proximity but offers an original device for framing 
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the response to it. Virilio’s spastic uses technologies to control his/her environment, 
minimising face-to-face encounters after an aversion to human proximity. What is 
valuable here is Virilio’s concern for what is lost by this spastic kind of 
disassociation. He writes that with the ‘degradation of the physical proximity of 
beings’ we lose the tie that binds sociality (ibid, p.58). The problem is that although 
Virilio understood this repulsion to proximity he could not explain it in the first place, 
nor does he ground sociality in anything more cogent than the sort of ‘blood and soil’ 
rhetoric that would make any historian of the twentieth-century shudder. This is where 
the reading of Levinas adopted above can come in. Proximity can be repulsive 
because the unknowable other is a source of ontological insecurity – fearsomely so – 
and because the encounter with the other demands that we limit our actions, act 
against our will, despite ourselves, which is to say, ‘for-the-other’ (ethics). The 
degradation of proximity is disastrous (Virilio associates it with the sort of pollution 
that leads to environmental disaster) because ethical sociality is grounded in the 
encounter. 
 
 Substantiated in this way, the usefulness of Virilio’s spastic device is illustrated by 
the ‘total gating’ example. Total gating utilises urban, vehicular and ICT technologies 
to control the environment of encounters. The gating and security of residential space 
provides a mooring safe from random encounters, from within which the insider’s 
mobility can be organised whilst the outsider’s mobility is impeded. If places of work 
and leisure are included in the gated constellation then those places that are shared 
with others (the office, the gym) become safe moorings shared with similar others. 
Bubbled mobility utilising private roads and/or the tank-like Hummers or SUVs 
further prevents the random encounter, ensuring safe passage to those engagements 
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with individuals whose proximity is compelling – for example, business meetings, 
which Boden and Molotch note are frequently face-to-face affairs despite tele-
conferencing technologies  (1994, pp.270-74; 2004, p.104). ICTs allow for virtual 
engagement with privileged others whilst locked-in behind the gates, or moving 
within bubbles between private/fortified nodal points. What we see, then, are 
strategies of mobility organised around strategically situated moorings designed to 
allow for a selective disassociation.  
 
Selective disassociation means that interaction can be limited only to those who are 
similar, and so a veil of security can be drawn over those insecure others. Without the 
confrontation with these supposedly risky others there is little real awareness of them 
(outside of an ‘awareness’ or ‘fear’ of their risk) and so no sense of responsibility for 
them. Without responsibility there is no social bond: they remain on the other side of 
the veil. Spasticity, then, is this refusal of the other through technologically-assisted 
selective disassociation: a refusal to acknowledge the other and to bear any 
responsibility for them achieved through the use of technologies to control the 
experience of the environment and of those within it. As such, total gating can be seen 
as a systematic form of spasticity. It is motivated by the fear of the other rooted in 
ontological insecurity and has as its effect the refusal of the responsibility for the 
other – which grounds sociality – through selective disassociation as a form of 
controlling the environment of encounters. 
 
Proximity shapes mobility. Urry has also drawn attention to the ‘relationality’ or 
‘dialectic of mobility/moorings’, to how mobilities and moorings are mutually 
constructed (2003, see esp. pp.125-26; see also Hannam, Sheller & Urry, 2006). 
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Moorings are the fixed site from which we negotiate our social encounters, travelling 
out into the world by compulsion of proximity. Moorings are the time/space of 
grounded sociality. However, proximity can also be repellent. The other’s otherness is 
repulsive, the demands they make of us force us to act despite ourselves. But ethics is 
a way of being, a direction – and directing ourselves towards that which is repellent is 
the very stuff of moral behaviour. What I want to suggest is that a theory of 
mobility/moorings must also include an account of ethical sociality. Social space is 
moral space. When we organise mobilities around a moored centre we are 
simultaneously exerting control over encounters, encounters that awaken us to 
responsibility. I have demonstrated how a radical reading of Levinas can help us to 
understand the fear of the other that motivates the gated mooring around which 
bubbled mobilities are organised. Reading this alongside Virilio’s notion of the 
spastic has enabled us to explore the idea of the repulsion of proximity through the 
sort of technologically-assisted mobility management strategies seen with total gating. 
Including this Virilio-Levinasian notion of spasticity, of strategies of 
mobility/moorings utilised in response to the repulsion of proximity, alongside 
compulsion driven mobility, might better help us to examine the impact on one of the 
core ties of sociality – that is, responsibility – in future case studies. Alongside the 
stranger (Simmel), the flâneur (Benjamin), the tourists and the vagabonds (Bauman), 
we might add this spastic to the dramatis personae of the city’s flows and stoppages. 
                                                 
Notes 
 
1 All references to Wynyard Park come from the online brochure available here: 
http://www.wynyardpark.com/ 
2 Following Crang, Crosbie and Graham (2006, p.2553) I suggest we understand what 
is meant by ICT to include telephony, television, computers, etc – and the interaction 
of these elements together. An understanding of how these technologies are used 
together will allow us to assess their impact upon the urban environment. 
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3 Virilio puts the dangers of withdrawal somewhat poetically: ‘the world, the planet, is 
becoming a blockhouse, a closed house, foreclosed’ (2002, p.88). 
4 Phillips and Smith (2006, p.899) also talk of moving in a ‘protective bubble of air’ 
in their study of urban incivility, demonstrating the intuitive value of the ‘bubbling’ 
metaphor. 
5 See Flusty, 1997, p.48 for an excellent account of what he calls ‘interdictory spaces’: 
spaces that intercept, repel or filter would-be occupants. See also Bauman, 2008b, 
pp.98-104 for his account of anthropoemic spaces (spaces that vomit or repel the 
other, such as fortified places of business) and anthropophagic spaces (spaces that 
assimilate or make same the other, such as shopping centres). Note: the gated 
community would be both, repelling others and making same any remaining otherness 
of the residents through housing agreements. 
6 My reading of Levinas on sociality is informed by that of Bauman, who observes: 
‘We are not moral thanks to society […]; we live in society, we are society, thanks to 
being moral. At the heart of sociality is the loneliness of the moral person’ (2009, 
p.61). Such a reading highlights the connection between the social and the pre-
ontological, ethical movement that allows two ontological distinct entities – the ‘I’ 
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